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ABSTRACT
Trained Deep Neural Network (DNN) models are considered valu-
able Intellectual Properties (IP) in several business models. Pre-
vention of IP theft and unauthorized usage of such DNN models
has been raised as of significant concern by industry. In this pa-
per, we address the problem of preventing unauthorized usage of
DNN models by proposing a generic and lightweight key-based
model-locking scheme, which ensures that a lockedmodel functions
correctly only upon applying the correct secret key. The proposed
scheme, known as Deep-Lock, utilizes S-Boxes with good security
properties to encrypt each parameter of a trained DNN model with
secret keys generated from a master key via a key scheduling algo-
rithm. The resulting dense network of encrypted weights is found
robust against model fine-tuning attacks. Finally, Deep-Lock does
not require any intervention in the structure and training of the
DNN models, making it applicable for all existing software and
hardware implementations of DNN.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The remarkable success of Deep Neural Networks (DNN) has cre-
ated numerous opportunities for commercial applications. Con-
structing accurate DNN models for targeted applications is non-
trivial, as it demands domain expertise and powerful computing
resources. On the other hand, the datasets used for training are
deemed one of the most valuable assets of modern businesses. Con-
sequently, modern business models consider trained DNNs as In-
tellectual Property (IP) cores. The presence of such IP cores both
in embedded platforms (Google Coral, Intel NCS) and cloud-based
Machine-Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) (Amazon AWS, BigML)
creates multiple practical security concerns. One such potent threat
is the stealing decision boundary of the IP Core (also called Model
Stealing), which has been addressed previously by several work [5,
7]. Businesses may suffer economic losses, as well as losses of brand
value due to such incidents.
In this work, we address another threat model, which has been
proposed recently in [2]. This is concerned with themodel piracy of
DNN models that may also result in significant economic losses for
the original model owner. While model stealing may also lead to
illegal usage, the problem of model piracy is more fundamental. An
adversary may obtain/access a model from several other unwanted
sources and continue using it as a black box (without bothering
stealing its decision boundary). Unless there is some mechanism
implemented for authorized access, this threat can never be miti-
gated. While this threat is applicable both in the context of MLaaS
and embedded platforms, it is more severe in the latter case as the
model can be easily extracted as a piece of software and distributed
among multiple parties.
Although there exist techniques for watermarking a given DNN
model for establishing model ownership [1, 3, 4], they cannot pre-
vent its illegal usage. Hence, an explicit lockingmechanism for DNN
is in demand, which will prevent unauthorized usage by making
the model malfunction. Previous research in this area has mainly fo-
cused on obfuscating model structures [6]. However, a more critical
component of a DNN IP is the trained parameters. Most industrial
applications typically use previously published DNN architectures,
which have demonstrated high modeling capabilities but use dif-
ferent parameters depending on applications. Observing this, we
present Deep-Lock, which enables a secret key-based locking for
DNN parameters. Unauthorized access, without the knowledge of
the legitimate key, makes the model unusable by severely degrading
the model accuracy. Deep-Lock utilizes S-Boxes with good crypto-
graphic properties to lock each trained parameter of a DNN model,
which is found to be a lightweight approach for model locking,
without causing any significant degradation in the inference time
and model size. The secret keys required for locking are generated
from amaster key via a key schedule. The master key is only needed
to be stored within the device. Moreover, the locking mechanism
works on trained models and has no interaction with the training
phase, making it generic and scalable for different model types. We
have verified our claims over several industry-scale DNN models.
We also considered improving the locked model accuracy by model
fine-tuning, where a manifest dataset1 is used for improving the
model accuracy even for wrong key values. It was found that model
fine-tuning fails to improve a model’s accuracy to a practically
significant value.
Deep-Lock bears certain similarities with a key-dependent hardware-
assisted DNN IP protection scheme (HPNN) proposed in [2]. How-
ever, HPNN requires changes to be made in the model structure,
which is not there in Deep-Lock, easing its usability. Furthermore,
Deep-Lock uses established cryptographic constructs for locking,
1The manifest dataset is a set of labeled data that is apparent to the user, though
not necessarily a subset of original training dataset, but resembles sufficiently to the
original training dataset.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
05
96
6v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
3 A
ug
 20
20
which is lacking in HPNN. It is worth noting that Deep-Lock differs
significantly from state-of-the-art software product key schemes,
where a key is verified before giving access to a locked software.
The security of such schemes depends on the verification step, and
there exist several well-known techniques to bypass this verifica-
tion check and gain control over the entire product. Furthermore,
once the verification step is passed, the unlocked model remains in
the memory from where it can be stolen without much hindrance.
On the other hand, Deep-Lock embeds the verification mechanism
inside the DNN and mandates verification for every query made to
the network. This never leaves the unlocked model in the memory,
making the direct steal of the model challenging.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses
the adversarial threat model considered in this work. Section 3
presents the proposed methodology in details. The evaluation of
performance and security of the proposed model is demonstrated
in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes
the work.
2 THREAT MODEL
The primary objective of this work is that a DNN model owner will
provide services only to authorized customers who have acquired
a license for model usage by paying an amount. To achieve the
objective, the model owner encrypts the DNN model with a secret
key. An adversary aims to use the encrypted DNNmodel accurately
without paying a license fee to the model owner. In this scenario, we
consider an adversary who has white-box access to the encrypted
model, i.e., she knows model structure as well as all encrypted
parameter values. The only information she does not know is the
secret key used to encrypt the model. We also assume that the
adversary has a manifest dataset, which she can use to query the
model with a key guess to obtain an output. If the adversary uses
encrypted parameters in the stolen DNN architecture, it produces
wrong input-output mapping as she does not have a legitimate
secret key.
3 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
The proposed key-based authorization scheme Deep-Lock operates
in two modes – offline mode and online mode. In the offline mode,
a DNN model owner trains and locks a model, and in the online
mode, the DNNmodel is deployed for practical usage. The overview
of all the operations performed in the offline mode is as follows:
• First, a DNN model owner acquires a massive set of data related
to a particular task and expends a considerable amount of money,
experts knowledge, and computational resources to label the data
and train a model. The model owner can exercise any popularly
used learning technique for fine-tuning model parameters to
obtain the most accurate model.
• The DNN model owner then selects a master key and uses a
key-scheduling algorithm to generate different secret keys cor-
responding to each trained parameter. The parameters are then
encrypted with an S-Box operation using the derived secret keys.
The original model parameters are replaced with these encrypted
values before deploying it for practical usage. The lock operation
is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Lock Operation
Input :Set of n real-valued trained DNN parameters:
{w0,w1, . . . ,wn−1}; A master key K ; A
Key_Schedule algorithm; A substitution-box
mapping Sbox
Output :Locked DNN parameters: {w ′0,w ′1, . . . ,w ′n−1}
{k0,k1, . . . ,kn−1} = Key_Schedule(K);
for i ← 0 to n − 1 do
wbini = binary representation ofwi ;
Eki (wbini ) = Sbox[wbini ⊕ ki ];
w ′i = converted real value of Eki (wbini );
end
Algorithm 2: Unlock Operation
Input :Set of n real-valued locked DNN parameters:
{w ′0,w ′1, . . . ,w ′n−1}; An input key Kinput ; A
Key_Schedule algorithm; An inverse
substitution-box mapping InvSbox
Output :Unlocked DNN parameters:
{wunlocked0 ,wunlocked1 , . . . ,wunlockedn−1 }
{kinput0 ,k
input
1 , . . . ,k
input
n−1 } = Key_Schedule(Kinput );
for i ← 0 to n − 1 do
(wbini )′ = binary representation ofw ′i ;
(wbini )unlocked = InvSbox[(wbini )′] ⊕ k
input
i ;
wunlockedi = converted real value of (wbini )unlocked ;
end
• Finally, the DNN model owner distributes the locked model to
authorized customers for practical usage. In a cloud-based service,
the secret key can be distributed along with an access to the
locked model. However, in a deployed hardware device, the secret
key can be embedded into a trusted platform module (TPM),
assuming that an adversary can neither access the TPM nor
retrieve the key from it.
In the online mode of operation, a user needs to produce a
master key during each query. The same key-scheduling algorithm
used during the offline mode of operation takes the master key as
input and generates decryption keys for each locked parameters.
The parameters are then decrypted with the Inverse S-Box operation
and the derived secret keys. The unlock operation is shown in Al-
gorithm 2. Thus, for a correct master key, all the locked parameters
will be correctly decrypted, and the model will produce a correct
prediction. However, for an incorrect key the model will produce a
wrong prediction.
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The method is evaluated on Intel Xeon CPU E5-2690 v4 @ 2.60GHz
with 56 cores. The Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) structures
and the number of trainable parameters for each evaluation dataset
are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Datasets and Models
Dataset Network Structure Number ofParameters
MNIST C, MP, C, MP, FC, FC 86,166
Fashion-MNIST C, MP, C, MP, FC, FC 180,438
CIFAR-10 C, C, MP, C, C, MP, FC, FC 1,250,858
C: Convolution Layer,MP:MaxPool Layer, FC: Fully Connected Layer
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Figure 1: (a) Classification accuracy of the original trained
model, locked model with a correct key input, and locked
model with a wrong key guess (b) Average prediction time
of a single input for both unencrypted and locked model
4.1 Accuracy of Locked Models
We have locked each model mentioned in Table 1 with a master key
using Deep-Lock. Without loss of generality, we have considered
AES SBox and AES key-scheduling algorithm to lock the models.
Figure 1a shows the original classification accuracies of the trained
CNN models, the classification accuracies of the locked models for
correct master key, the average accuracies of the locked models
over 100 randomly selected incorrect keys. We can observe that
Deep-Lock does not compromise the accuracy of the trained models.
We can also observe that, for a wrong key, locked models work as
a random classifier.
4.2 Performance Overhead
The average response time of both unencrypted and locked DNN
models for classifying a single input are shown in Figure 1b. We can
observe that the overhead is not significant for MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST. However, we obtain a comparatively higher overhead for
the CIFAR-10 dataset. The figures are based on the sequential exe-
cution of software implementations of the DNN models. However,
these can be significantly improvedwith high level of parallelization
in dedicated hardware accelerators.
5 SECURITY EVALUATION
In order to compare the security benefits with the recent light-
weight hardware-assisted key-dependent DNN obfuscation frame-
work HPNN [2], we provide a security evaluation of Deep-Lock
considering model fine-tuning attacks. In a model fine-tuning at-
tack, an adversary’s objective is to retrain the locked model to an
optimum parameter setting, which is different from the original,
to obtain a comparative performance of the original model. The
assumptions for an adversary in this attack are that she has the
expertise and powerful computational resources to train any DNN
model. To perform the model fine-tuning attack, an adversary ob-
tains the DNN architecture and the model parameters from a locked
model and utilizes the manifest dataset to retrain the model. The
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Figure 2: Validation accuracies for each DNN model over
training iterations during model fine-tuning
attack is considered successful if the adversary obtains high accu-
racy with a wrong key from the locked model. For this experiment,
we have considered that the adversary has access to 10% of the
training data. It is shown in [2] that with this dataset, an adversary
can fine-tune a DNN model locked with the HPNN framework to
achieve 82.43% and 78.53% accuracy for Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-
10 dataset. We applied a similar strategy for Deep-Lock, and the
validation accuracy over training iterations for all the models is
shown in Figure 2. We can observe from the figure that even if
an adversary has access to 10% of the original training data, he is
not able to retrain the model with a comparable accuracy of the
original model. In fact, the validation accuracies do not improve
from a random classification.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a lightweight, generic, key-based DNN IP
protection scheme Deep-Lock using an S-Box and key-scheduling
algorithms to defend against unauthorized usage of stolen DNN
models. The method ensures that only an authorized user with a
correct master key can accurately use the locked DNN model, and
a wrong master key will provide random classification. Deep-Lock
does not modify any structural details of a DNN model, making
it scalable for all existing software and hardware DNN implemen-
tations without adversely affecting performance. We evaluated
Deep-Lock for various DNN architectures and datasets. We have
also demonstrated its robustness against model fine-tuning attack.
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